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Money in a Sovereign Quebec
If Quebec were to separate, either amicably or acrimoniously, its chances
of continuing to use the Canadian dollar are practically nil
The likely monetary regime of a sovereignQuebec will be a key issue if there is a re-ferendum on sovereignty. Judging from the
1980 referendum, the soundness of the currency
could well be the make or break issue, and should
be of keen interest to Canadian businesses. If
Quebec were to separate, managers would find
themselves in the difficult position of having to
assess their exposure to currency risk in the uncer-
tain environment of a country being split asunder.
Consequently, for reasons of informed political
choice and prudent business strategic planning, it
is critical that all of the complex ramifications of
money after sovereignty be fully understood.
Quebec People Like the Canadian Dollar
Quebeckers have a deep attachment and high
level of confidence in the Canadian dollar.
Sovereigntist politicians recognize this fact and do
their utmost to assuage worries that sovereignty
might mean the establishment of a new, and likely
shaky, Quebec currency. Jacques Parizeau, the
leader of the Parti Quebecois, was quoted in Le
Devoir as saying that to create a Quebec currency
would be to take a big risk and put in peril the
economic levers of a sovereign Quebec. In .early
1992 he told a group of institutional investors in
Montreal that "Quebec as a sovereign nation
would choose the Canadian dollar. That's abso-
lutely certain."
Sovereigntists have not always voiced such
strong support for the Canadian dollar. In a pam-
phlet released in 1990 the PQ stated that it advo-
cates a monetary union with Canada, but if
Canada refused, Quebec would adopt its own cur-
rency as has been done by almost all independent
states.
More curiously, the most recent PQ program,
which was prepared before Mr. Parizeaus latest
utterings on the Canadian dollar, is relatively quiet
on the PQ's plans for Quebec's monetary future.
All it says is, "Quebec could accept under certain
conditions to use the same money as Canada."
Evidently, not everyone in the PQ shares Mr.
Parizeau's total and unqualified commitment to the
Canadian dollar.
The source of Mr. Parizeau's professed belief that
Quebec can continue to use the Canadian dollar
even without the agreement of Canada was the
Belanger-Campeau Commission. It took the posi-
tion in its report that all that was required to main-
tain the Canadian dollar as the currency of a
sovereign Quebec was the adoption of legislation
declaring the Canadian dollar legal tender in
Quebec. A simplistic position such as this can only
be interpreted as a bargaining ploy intended to
strengthen Quebec's hand in negotiations with the
rest of Canada. It completely ignores the overrid-
ing importance of confidence in something as
fragile as paper currency and the payments sys-
tem.
The Nature of the Breakup Would
Affect the Currency
Critical to the issue of the continued use of the
Canadian dollar and the maintenance of confi-
dence in the currency would be the nature of the
breakup. If the split were amicable, there would be
a possibility that an agreement could be reached
that would allow Quebec to continue to use the
Canadian dollar. On the other hand, if the separa-
tion were acrimonious, an agreement would be
very difficult if not impossible.
An acrimonious split would be the most likely
outcome if the country were to break up. English
Canadians love their country and are apt to react
very emotionally to its destruction. Such a gut.
reaction is likely to be compounded by pocketbook
disputes over the sharing of assets and the debt.
The reception of the Belanger-Campeau proposal
for debt sharing shows how far apart the two sides
would be and the hostility likely to be engendered.
The importance of rationality in determining
economic institutions is overestimated. If it were
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the overriding factor, Canada would probably al-
ready be part of a U.S. dollar currency area. But the
politics of Canadian nationalism makes such a de-
velopment virtually anathema. Politics often takes
precedence over economics.
The only possible reason that sovereigntists can
be so insistent in claiming an agreement is not
necessary for Quebec to continue to use the Cana-
dian dollar is that they fear an acrimonious breakup.
Otherwise they would argue for an agreement, be-
cause an agreement would unquestionably be es-
sential to maintain confidence in the currency.
Impossible for Quebec to Use the Canadian
Dollar Without Agreement
Only the Canadian government can run a Cana-
dian dollar monetary system. Without an explicit
agreement with the Canadian government, the
confidence that is so critical to the functioning of
a financial system would be lacking.' The Cana-
dian government alone can print the currency that
people want to hold, and make the rules under
which the payments system operates. While al-
most a quarter of the Canadian money supply is
now in Quebec hands, these bills will wear out and
must be replaced on a regular basis. The average
life of $2, $5 and $10 bills is currently about a year,
and the average life of a $20 bill around two years.
Only the Canadian government can supply re-
placement currency. Tokeep an adequate supply of
bills would require the regular delivery of
truckloads of bank notes. This would be much
more than the Quebec government could expect to
obtain through normal balance of payments trans-
actions, which are usually settled by bank drafts.
While membership in the Canadian Payments As-
sociation for Quebec financial institutions would
not be absolutely essential to clear Canadian dollar
transactions, it would facilitate the clearings and
would be critical in establishing the confidence
so necessary for the functioning of the financial
system.
Even with an Agreement There Would
be Difficulties
Even an agreement is not very strong glue for a
monetary union. If a monetary union were estab-
lished, there are grounds for pessimism about its
durability, which would serve to undermine confi-
dence. In the past, monetary unions without polit-
ical unions have always eventually collapsed. Pre-
mier Bourassa recognizes this inconvenient fact
that Mr. Parizeau has chosen to ignore. In a speech
to the ational Assembly on March 20, 1992,
which was celebrated by federalists and deplored
by sovereigntists, Premier Bourassa argued that a
monetary union requires a political union and that
the PQ's plan to separate but continue to use the
Canadian dollar was unworkable. This has been
Premier Bourassas position since that fateful day in
his basement in the early 1960s when he declined
to join Rene Levesque in founding the Parti
Quebecois,
The Canadian Government Could Block Quebec
Use of the Canadian Dollar
If Quebec were to separate on acrimonious terms
and were not to assume its fair share of the public
debt, the reaction of the rest of Canada would be
understandably hostile. In such a climate, there are
some, admittedly extreme, steps that the Canadian
government could take to prevent Quebec from
using the Canadian dollar. Restrictions could be
put on the export of Canadian currency. Existing
Canadian currency could be recalled and new
notes issued. Or regulations could be established
to deny Quebec financial institutions direct access
to the Canadian Payments Association. The mere
threat of these measures would probably be
enough to create a crisis of confidence that would
knock Quebec right off the Canadian dollar.
The prospect of a crisis of confidence would have
many of the aspects of self-fulfilling prophecy. If
the holders of deposits of Quebec financial institu-
tions denominated in Canadian dollars were to
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outcome if the country were to break up. 11
become worried that the Quebec government
might pass a law changing the currency of the
deposits into Quebec dollars, they would with-
draw their money from Quebec financial institu-
tions for redeposit in Canadian, or most likely
U.S., institutions where it would be safe from de-
valuation. If the withdrawal of funds were suffi-
ciently large, the Quebec financial institutions
would quickly exhaust their liquidity reserves and
would have to call their loans to honor their obliga-
tions. The resulting credit crunch would have a
devastating impact on the non-financial sector of
the Quebec economy, precipitating a collapse in
asset values and investment. The solvency of
Quebec financial institutions could even be jeopar-
dized. The only way the Quebec government could
relieve the building recessionary pressures and
preserve the financial system would be to an-
nounce a separate Quebec currency and to devalue
it sufficiently to establish confidence that no
further devaluations were likely.
The resort to extreme measures by the Canadian
government to block the use of the Canadian dollar
by a sovereign Quebec would not be desirable and
would undoubtedly only be taken if there was a
complete breakdown of relations between Quebec
and the rest of Canada.
A study by Oavid Laidler and William Robson,
published by the CO. Howe Institute, has been
cited by sovereigntists as evidence that there is
nothing the Canadian government could do to
prevent Quebec from using the Canadian dollar. A
closer reading of this study reveals that what it
actually says is, "The actions that the government
of ROC (rest of canada) would need to take to
prevent SQ (sovereign Quebec) from doing so -
namely, the introduction of comprehensive foreign
exchange controls - seem beyond the bounds of
political possibility." Laidler and Robson never
question that the government of Canada could
stop Quebec from using the Canadian dollar if
it was willing to take the necessary action, but
question only that it would have the political will
to do so. This should not provide much comfort to
Quebeckers desirous of retaining the Canadian
dollar. If the backlash in English Canada unleashed
by the breakup were strong enough, the political
will would be there to do everything necessary to
ensure that Canada was not taken advantage of.
Laidler and Robson are profoundly pessimistic
about the long-term prospects for the continuing
use of the Canadian dollar in Quebec for many of
the same reasons discussed here.
There are Many Advantages of a Monetary Union
The advantages of the Canadian monetary union
are great. It reduces transaction costs within the
country and promotes the free flow of goods, ser-
vices and capital, thus enhancing economic effi-
ciency. The larger the size of the monetary union
the more stable is the value of the currency and the
better able it is to serve its function as a store of
value. A larger monetary union and a more stable
currency also lead to smaller risk premiums and
lower interest rates. This has important implica-
tions for investment, longer term growth and
standards of living.
The lack of a common currency between Canada
and Quebec, if no agreement were reached on a
monetary union, would be more troublesome for
Quebec than Canada. The smaller and more open
an economy is and the less diversified and the
more variable economic activity is, the fewer the
benefits from a floating exchange rate in fostering
adjustment and the higher the costs in increased
transaction costs and volatility. Bernard Fortin's
estimate that a separate Quebec currency could
cost Quebec $1 billion per year or 0.6% of Quebec
GOP is illustrative. The costs to Canada would be
comparable in absolute dollars, but, as a propor-
tion of GOP,only one-quarter as much, taking into
account Canada's higher GOP.This is a cost Canada
could afford, either to avoid some of the disadvan-
tages of a shared currency or, if separation brings
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"In the past, monetary unions without political
unions have always eventually collapsed."
out the worst in Canadians, simply to indulge its
antagonism towards a newly sovereign Quebec.
Two separate currencies would lead to disputes
over the appropriate exchange rate. While it is
evident from Quebec's weak current account posi-
tion that a Quebec dollar would have to trade at a
significant discount to the Canadian dollar, the
precise magnitude of the discount would be far
from obvious. If the Quebec dollar sank to too
deep a discount, or if the Quebec government was
perceived to be trying to use an undervalued dollar
to engineer a competitive advantage, serious con-
flicts could arise that could threaten trade rela-
tions. Neither Quebec nor Canada should expect
to determine unilaterally the appropriate exchange
rate between the Quebec and Canadian dollar if it
were fixed, or expect to conduct a market interven-
tion strategy without consulting the other if it were
allowed to float. An exchange rate is a two-way
thing.
The value of the Canadian dollar after separation
is a related issue. In the ensuing financial chaos,
down would be the predicted direction; how far is
anybody's guess. For example, Premier Bourassa, a
man of legendary caution, has speculated it could
go to 75 cents, which must be acknowledged as a
real possibility. Once the dust settled, however, the
Canadian dollar would firm up, and, when the
market finally came to register the implications of
Canada's strengthened balance of payments with-
out Quebec, the Canadian dollar would probably
be pushed above its pre-separation value.
An additional advantage of a monetary union is
that it would make it easier for Quebec to assume
its fair share of the government debt. Since this
debt is denominated in Canadian dollars, Quebec
could be expected to bargain harder for a lower
share if it were to have its own currency. Obvi-
ously, Quebec would experience more difficulties
in carrying its share of the debt load denominated
a foreign currency. If Quebec, counting on a
monetary union, were to assume a larger share of
the debt counting on a monetary union, however,
and were eventually to be forced off the Canadian
dollar by market forces or policy decisions and end
up burdened with a large foreign currency debt
anyway, gaining a temporary monetary union
would turn out to be a pyrrhic victory.
Canada Might Not Want Quebec to Use
the Canadian Dollar
Sovereigntists argue that it would be in Canada's
interest to have Quebec continue to use the Cana-
dian dollar. Whereas it is true that a wider common
currency area would have certain advantages in
facilitating trade and contributing to a more stable
dollar, there would also be some definite problems
tha t would arise for Canada if Canada were to
allow Quebec to use the Canadian dollar. It would
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the
Canadian regulatory authorities to guarantee the
solvency of the Canadian financial system if
Quebec financial institutions could clear through
the Canadian Payments Association and the Office
of the Supervisor of Financial Institutions (OSFI)
did not have supervisory authority over thern.?
The bankruptcy of a major Quebec institution
could occur without warning and could bring
down the Canadian financial institution with
which it had clearing arrangements. This would be
a particular risk during the transition period to
Quebec independence when the Quebec financial
system would be subject to extraordinary strains.
It would be in the interest of Canada to try to insu-
late itself as much as possible from the likely post-
sovereignty disruptions of the Quebec financial
system.
One of the great strengths of the current Cana-
dian economic union is the national financial sys-
tem with country-wide branching, which transfers
savings from surplus areas to deficit areas and
contributes to the efficient allocation of resources.
Canada's system has worked much better than its
U.S. coun terpart, which is now mired in crisis.
.j
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relieve the building recessionary pressures and
preserve the financial system would be to
announce a separate Quebec currency"
Over the past 20 years only two small regional
banks and 20 near banks have failed in Canada,
compared to hundreds in the U.S.
The breakup of the country would also fragment
the current Canadian financial system on Canada-
Quebec lines. There would no longer be a single
regulatory authority and legislative framework.
After Quebec independence, OSFIwould continue
to have responsibility for overseeing the global
operations of financial institutions licensed in
Canada. In Quebec the mandate of the Inspecteur
general des institutions financieres would have to
be expanded to include the regulation of the for-
merly federally regulated institutions operating in
Quebec. As a result of the likely efforts of both
Canada and Quebec to regulate the same financial
institutions, the individual institutions would have
to be reorganized along Canada-Quebec national
lines. Foreign ownership restrictions are already in
existing Canadian financial institution legislation.
The PQ program says it will adopt appropriate
means to protect Quebec financial institutions from
foreign (including presumably Canadian) owner-
ship. It would be very difficult for the Canadian
and Quebec regulatory agencies to coordinate their
activities in the wake of the breakup, given the
inevitable frictions that would arise.
Quebec sovereignty would sound the death
knell of Canada's current financial system a mari
usque ad mare. The splintering of the current Cana-
dian financial system at the Canada-Quebec border
would reduce the efficiency of financial markets
and raise the cost of funds to borrowers. It would
also reduce the stability of the financial system,
particularly in Quebec, by reducing the extent to
which financial institutions could diversify the
risks of their loans and deposits across the whole
country.
In addition, the Bank of Canada's conduct of
monetary policy would be made more difficult if a
large proportion of Canadian currency and Cana-
dian dollar bank accounts were outside its control.
Quebec financial institutions could not be compel-
led to report regularly to the Bank of Canada as are
Canadian financial institutions. This would make it
more difficult for the Bank of Canada to rely on
current monetary indicators to gauge the stance of
monetary policy. More importantly, monetary pol-
icy would have to be altered in response to changes
in the money supply caused by inflows and out-
flows of Canadian dollars from Quebec resulting
from among other things different macroeconomic
policy stances in Quebec and Canada. This could
conflict with the domestic objectives of monetary
policy such as the pursuit of price stability.
Quebec Could Decide to Abandon the
Canadian Dollar on its Own
From Quebec's point of view, there would be
disadvantages as well as advantages in continuing
to use the Canadian dollar. For one, Quebec would
not be able to conduct an independent monetary
policy and would have to accept a Canadian
monetary policy developed with little regard for
economic conditions in Quebec. Some might say
that this would be little worse than the status quo,
but Quebec has no less voice at the Bank of Canada
than other regions of the country. Even if English
Canada were to go along with a monetary union
with Quebec, it would not be likely to yield any
significant say in the formulation of monetary pol-
icy to a sovereign Quebec. Other provinces would
find it very difficult to accept Quebec representa-
tion on the central bank from which they were
excluded.
There are strong forces at work that would make
it almost inevitable that a sovereign Quebec would
devalue and seek to pursue an independent and
more inflationary monetary policy. There is dis-
satisfaction with the current relatively tight stance
of monetary policy, and a naive belief in some
quarters that easy money could promote full em-
ployment. For instance, the PQ's program is very
critical of the current monetary policy, and argues
"Leidler and Robson are profoundly pessimistic
about the long-term prospects for the continuing
use of the Canadian dollar in Quebec."
that measures taken to reduce overheating of the
Ontario economy have often aggravated what was
considered too high unemployment in Quebec.
The PQ claims that it would put an absolute prior-
ity on full employment and is silent on the objec-
tive of price stability. It is understandably vague on
how it might seek to achieve full employment, but
an inflationary monetary policy is a nostrum that
it would probably find hard to resist.
An independent Quebec would have serious
current account and fiscal deficit problems. In 1990
Quebec had a deficit of merchandise imports over
exports of $4.2 billion or 2.7% of GDp, according to
the Quebec Bureau of Statistics. In the same year,
Canada as a whole had a surplus of $10.9 billion
or 1.6% of GDP. If Quebec's share of the deficit on
non-merchandise transactions were estimated
using its share of GDp, it would add another $7.6
billion or almost 5% of GDP to Quebec's deficit on
merchandise trade to yield an estimate of $11.8
billion or 7.6% of GDP for Quebec's current ac-
count deficit.:' This is a deficit that is three times
higher than Canada's deficit of 2.4% of GDP in the
same year and an order of magnitude higher than
in the other G-7 countries. The situation has de-
teriorated in 1992and it could turn out even worse
if, as appears likely, a large risk premium gets built
into the interest paid on Quebec's expanded exter-
nal debt. A sovereign Quebec would be as close to
a balance of payments basket case as could be
found among the major industrialized countries.
Poor Prognosis for the Canadian Dollar
in a Sovereign Quebec
With so much that could go wrong and confi-
dence so fragile, the odds are very much against a
continued monetary union if Quebec were to sepa-
rate. Sooner or later, and most likely sooner, the
govern~ent of a sovereign Quebec would abandon
the Canadian dollar and establish a devalued
Quebec dollar. Managers certainly need to factor
this risk into their business calculations, but, most
importantly, Quebeckers need to take this into
account in deciding on whether to put nationalism
ahead of their economic interest and opt for
sovereignty. BQ
Notes .
1The Bahamas and Panama currently use the U.S. dollar with-
out a formal agreement, but these countries are very small
relative to the U.S., have its acquiescence and have access to
adequate currency brought in by the tourist trade and the".
Canal Zone.
2The Caisse de depot et placement du Quebec, which is not
subject to OSFI, currently clears through the Canadian Pay-
ments Association. This does not pose a threat to the solvency
of the payments system, however, because the Caisses
liabilities are long-term pension contracts that, unlike short-
term deposits can not be withdrawn quickly.
3While information is not available on Quebec's non-merchan-
dise trade balance, there is no reason to believe that Quebec's
share of Canada's balance would be less than its GDP share.
Quebec has one of the highest provincial-local debt to GDP
ratios. Its larger relative current account deficit could be
expected to lead to a higher ratio of external debt. In addition,
if Quebec were to assume its per capita share of federal debt,
its share of federal debt as a proportion of GDPwould increase.
